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Abstract 
Increasing scarcity of fossil fuels makes the deployment of hydrogen in combination with 
renewable energy sources or the utilization of electricity from full time operation of existing power 
stations an interesting alternative. A pre-requisite is, however, the safety of the required 
infrastructure is investigated and its design is evaluated with the associated risk to know, at least, 
the risks are not higher than that of existing supplies.  Therefore, a risk analysis considering its most 
important objects such as storage tanks, filling stations, vehicles as well as heating and electricity 
supplies for residential buildings was carried out. The last is considered as representative of the 
entire infrastructure. The risk analysis is based on fault and event tree analyses, wherever required, 
and consequence calculations using the PHAST code. The procedure for evaluating the risk and 
corresponding results will be presented taking one of the objects as an example. 
Keywords: hydrogen, risk, safety, fire, fault tree analyses, event tree analyses, explosion, PHAST. 
 
Abstrak 
Meningkatnya kelangkaan energi fosil membuat ide pemanfaatan hidrogen dalam kombinasi 
dengan sumber energi terbarukan  atau pemakaian listrik  dari suatu pusat pembangkitan yang 
beroperasi penuh menjadi alternatif yang amat menarik. Namun analisa awal adalah menyelidiki 
keamanan lingkungannya and disainya dievaluasi terkait dengan risiko terkait untuk mengetahui, 
sedikitnya, risiko tidak lebih besar dari sistem yang telah ada. Karenanya analisa risiko 
mempertimbangkan objek terpenting seperti tanki penyimpan, stasiun pengisisin, kendaraan, dan 
juga fasilitas pensuplai panas dan listrik untuk bangunan hunian dilakukan. Yang tersebut terakhir 
dipertimbangkan sebagai perwakilan seluruh infrastruktur. Analisa risiko ini didasarkan pada 
analisa pohon kesalahan dan kejadian bila diinginkan dan perhitungan besarnya kecelakaan 
menggunakan perangkat lunak PHAST. Prosedur untuk mengevaluasi risiko dan hasilnya akan 
ditampilkan dengan mengambil salah satu objek sebagai contoh. 
Kata kunci: hidrogen, risiko, keselamatan, kebakaran, fault tree analyses, event tree analyses 
ledakan, PHAST. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Hydrogen is seen by many experts as a major energy carrier for the future [2;13]. An 
energy economy based on hydrogen (especially when produced from renewable energy 
sources), with fuel cells as a major energy conversion technology could then resolve the 
major concerns about security of energy supply, source of diversification and reduction of 
greenhouse gas emission. In recent years, European industry has realized several hydrogen 
vehicle prototypes and demonstration vehicles equipped with internal combustion engines 
(ICE) and fuel cell electric drives (PEMFC) combined with onboard storage systems using 
compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) or cryogenic liquid hydrogen (LH2). More than 75 
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units of hydrogen fuelling stations in the worldwide are put into operation. Besides, 
hydrogen applications for residential equipped with fuel cell-combined heat and power 
(FC-CHP) are demonstrated worldwide to provide electricity and heat. 
 
The significant increase of hydrogen used as an energy carrier the risks of an accident in 
production plants, during storage and transport, or while being applied rise as well. 
Currently, safety-relevant problems of handling hydrogen in industrial scale are well 
controlled, however in the future “untrained” personnel will deal with hydrogen. Technical 
equipments used could be failure. Beyond that the possibility of handling incidents and 
human error will be happened at many places.   
 
The objective of the study is to determine promptly the safety-relevant boundary conditions 
for infrastructure of a hydrogen economy. A system-analytic method is used to evaluate of 
the system, in order the weak points of possible risks is proven and suggestions on the 
remedy are made.  Beyond that the determined risks are to be compared with standards, 
and/or with the similar technologies. 
 
 
2. HYDROGEN ECONOMY 
 
The term, "hydrogen energy economy" refers to global economy hydrogen, using hydrogen 
for energy carrier [10]. It is a vision for future in which economic system is based on the 
use of hydrogen as an energy storage and transport medium. The advantage of a hydrogen 
energy economy is that it could completely eliminate the problems created by our present 
fossil fuel economy. Hydrogen as a secondary energy carrier offers the best alternative 
solutions. Hydrogen produced from renewable energy provides an alternative fuel free of 
all carbon emissions, and offers a sustainable energy supply. Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles 
produce no emissions except for water vapour, creating a solution to current urban air 
pollution problems.  
 
2.1 Hydrogen Cycle 
 
A hydrogen energy economy mainly consists of three functional steps [10]:  
(1) production, 
(2) storage, transport, and distribution, and  
(3) end-uses. 
A closed loop energy system shown in Fig. 1 is envisage taking water from the water 
inventory of the earth, splitting it into hydrogen and oxygen, recombining them as they are 
turned into energy services, and giving water back to the inventory, quantitatively and 
qualitatively unaltered. With this vision energy sustainability is might nearly achieved. 
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Fig.1. Hydrogen energy carrier a closed-loop energy cycle [10] 
 
Presently hydrogen is mainly produced from fossil fuels via natural gas reforming as well 
as the partial oxidation of heavy fuel oil (or diesel) and coal. Electricity is presently the 
only secondary energy carrier used to produce hydrogen, either by the electrolysis of water 
or as a by-product resulting from the chlorine-alkaline electrolysis. For a large-scale 
storage, hydrogen can be stored underground in ex-mines, caverns and or aquifers. 
Hydrogen is then transported, by means of pipelines or super tankers, to energy 
consumption centres. It is then used in electricity, transportation, industrial, residential and 
commercial sectors as a fuel and or an energy carrier. 
 
2.2. Hydrogen Safety 
 
In principle, there is no absolute safety in engineering [6]. Every energy carrier has its 
specific safety risks. Hydrogen has a gross affinity to the air (oxygen), its flammable limit 
is wider and its energy ignition is very small. But the diffusion of hydrogen in air is 
quicker, so that the hydrogen leakage or hydrogen fire will quickly go up. In normal 
conditions hydrogen is an odourless and a colourless gas with molecular weight of 2.016 
[13]. It is the lightest among all elements. Its density is 0.08376 kg/m
3
 at standard 
temperature and pressure, it is about 14 times less than air. It is liquefied at 253°C, 
solidifies at 259.3°C, and having low critical point (240°C, 13 bar). Compared with 
other fuels, hydrogen has the highest energy content per unit mass among all fuels. 
Hydrogen has a higher heating value of  141.9 MJ/kg, it almost three times higher than 
gasoline. 
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Under ambient condition hydrogen is flammable over a wide range concentration from 4-
75%, and explosive in a range of 18.3% until 59% [10;13]. The minimum temperature 
required to initiate self-sustained combustion in a combustible fuel mixture in the absence 
of ignition source is 585°C, higher than other fuels. However, the minimum energy 
required to initiate combustion is 0.02 mJ (milli Joule), almost an order of magnitude lower 
than that conventional fuels. Therefore hydrogen can be combusted only by an ignition 
source such as a flame or a spark. Explosion of hydrogen is greater than methane at a much 
lower concentration. The diffusion coefficient for hydrogen is 0.61 cm
3
/sec, this is 4 times 
as high as that for methane. Hydrogen therefore mixes in air considerably faster than 
methane or petrol vapour, which is advantageous in the open air but represents a potential 
disadvantage in badly ventilated interiors. Since both hydrogen and natural gas are lighter 
than air they expand quickly.  
 
The prospect of hydrogen energy economy often raises safety question. Part of the reason is 
associated with the Hindenburg case where the German airship exploded in 1937 and  took 
36 lives. For years, it was widely believed that the cause of the explosion was ignition of 
the hydrogen gas used for lifting the airship [10]. In 1997, a NASA investigator Dr. 
Addison Bain, however, publicized his surprising finding that the highly combustible 
varnish that used to treat the fabric on the outside of the vessel most likely caused the 
tragedy.  
 
 
3. A QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD 
 
A quantitative risk analysis is focused on the combined effect of frequencies and 
consequences of a possible accident, as illustrated in Fig. 2 [10].  
The first step, before starting to quantify the risk, is related to defining and describing the 
system. Detail information of the system such as process flow diagram, operating condition 
may be required.  
The second step is hazard identification. The step seeks an answer to the question: what can 
go wrong? This is the most important step because hazards that are not identified will not 
quantified, leading to an underestimated risk. Based on this information the accident 
scenarios that will lead to system failure are determined.  
The third step involves another question: how likely is the accident? Answering the 
question involves quantification of the probability of each scenario. Fault tree analysis 
(FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) might be combined to be used for this purpose.  
The fourth step is consequence analysis. It aims to quantify the negative impacts of the 
scenarios. The consequences can be measured in terms of the number of fatalities (that is 
used in the study), number of injuries, or value of the property lost.  
The fifth or the last step of the QRA is to estimate and evaluate the risk. The risk can be 
expressed as individual risk or as societal risk, as the most frequently used risk measures. 
Terms of “tolerable risk” is introduced in this step. 
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Fig.2  Procedure for the application of risk assessment [10] 
 
 
3.1. Probabilistic Analysis 
 
It involves estimating the likelihood of each of the scenarios that were identified in the 
hazard identification step. Two basic forms of which likelihood can be expressed: 
frequency and probability. Frequency is the expected number of occurrences of the event 
per unit time. While, probability is the measure of how likely it is the same event will 
occur. The likelihood of the above hydrogen scenarios occurring during a given interval 
can be derived from the probabilities of each of the contributory events whose occurrence, 
separately or contemporaneously as appropriate, could lead to the occurrence of the event. 
Therefore, a dual approach to likelihood estimation was attempted. Firstly, fault tree 
analyses are carried out on the larger containment systems were safety depend on the 
reliability of a large number components. Secondly, failure rate data are used for certain 
discrete events for which adequate statistics exist, or for which system reliability 
considerations are not the main causes of the failure. In order to calculate frequency of the 
possible outcomes for the scenarios an event tree analysis was performed, i.e. by 
multiplying the initiating event frequency and their outcome probabilities. 
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3.1.1. Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
 
Fault tree analysis is an analytical tool that uses deductive reasoning and a graphical 
depiction of the reasoning process to determine the various combinations that, if they 
occur, lead to the occurrence of an undesired event [4;7]. This is the second QRA steps 
which answer to the question, “How is likely of the accident?” It is a structured, systematic 
approach that can be used to evaluate a single system or multiple systems and account for 
system interactions. It may be used in such way as to link the top event of a fault tree with 
an event tree. To evaluate the fault trees the study used an analytical approach based-
computer program developed by Hauptmanns (1988).  
 
3.1.2. Event tree analysis (ETA) 
 
Event tree analysis uses inductive logic and a graphical depiction to represent the various 
events (outcomes) that may follow from an initiating event. It uses branches to show the 
various possibilities that may arise at each step. It is often used to relate a failure event to 
various consequence models. Each branch is conditional on the previous answer in the tree. 
The frequency of each outcome is obtained by multiplying the outcome probabilities by 
initiating event frequency. A hydrogen release may have many event outcomes, depending 
on the timing and type of ignition. A release may ignite immediately at the point of release 
(e.g. fireball, jet fire, pool fire, or early explosion), or it may ignite after the cloud has been 
dispersing for several minutes (e.g. cloud flash fire, vapour cloud explosion, etc) or it may 
not ignite at all which means harmless. 
 
3.2. Consequence Analysis 
 
In parallel with frequency analysis, consequence analysis evaluates the resulting impact on 
the public and the environment of accidents or incidents occur [10]. Most of hydrogen plant 
accidents involve release of liquid, gas or both. The size of the accident will generally 
depend on the length of the release period and the rate of the release. This is in turn 
depends on the size of the hole, form of the hole, its position, and pressure. The 
consequence evaluation is performed by mathematical or computational modelling, which 
is used to predict the size, shape and orientation of hazard zones that could result from 
hydrogen events. The study used software named PHAST 6.4 to calculate consequence 
impacting from the hydrogen scenarios [1].  
 
3.3. Risks Estimation and Evaluation 
 
A risk as a quantitative measure of hazard can be expressed as the combination of 
consequence and likelihood [6]. The study used an analytical model to calculate a number 
of results relating to the impacts on population potentially affected by various hydrogen 
events. It employs the assumption that each event can be treated independently from other 
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events. This assumption can be made because the frequency of accidental releases in the 
chemical industry is mathematically very low in comparison with the duration of the 
hazardous effects themselves. Hydrogen risk assessment model developed in the study. The 
integration of the risk from all possible events can, therefore, be built up event by event, 
this is the principles underlying the model algorithm. While each event can be treated 
separately, this does not necessarily mean a discrete outcome. A given release event can 
give rise to different outcomes. Releases of flammable materials in particular can give rise 
to a range of hazardous phenomena depending on a number of factors. 
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Fig.3  A risk estimation model (analytical approach) used in the study [10] 
 
 
Fig. 3 shows relationship between the risk calculation model and its input and output, 
developed in study. The input of the model includes: relevant consequences effects for a 
given scenario resulted from the PHAST, frequencies for each possible event and outcome, 
ignition source, and wind direction probability. The wind directional probability needs to 
be taken into account so that the risk is correctly distributed within the region at risk from 
the collection of events. The calculated risks are then presented in the form of individual 
and societal risks. Individual risk (IR) expresses the likelihood of experiencing fatal effects 
at a given location, and is presented as cumulative curve of accident frequencies versus 
distance effects of the hydrogen incident outcomes. In other hand, the societal risk (SR) is 
expressed in terms of the likelihood of event outcomes that affect a given number of people 
in a single incident. The societal risk results as a measure of the risk that the events pose to 
the local population expressed by frequency F as a function of fatalities N, which is then 
plotted to give the F-N curve. The frequencies for given values of N can be summed for all 
outcomes and events to give the overall societal risk. 
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In many risk assessments it may be necessary to determining the level of acceptable risk 
during the scoping process. The criteria must be established prior to performing 
quantitative risk assessment to enable comparison against the desired safety level. The 
study uses the risk acceptance criteria called “ALARP” (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable) or “ALARA” (As Low As Reasonably Achievable). They are proposed by the 
European Integrated Hydrogen project phase 2 (EIHP2), as well as by the German accident 
commission for risk management [3;11].  
 
 
4. CASE STUDY 
 
4.1. System description 
 
The study considers a solar hydrogen plant situated in Germany. The plant was built in 
1986, as a joint venture Bayernwerk AG, BMW AG, Linde AG, Siemens AG [10]. 
The plant is an industrial-scale demonstration facility. It comprises major system 
components of a possible future energy supply based on (solar) hydrogen, such as 
photovoltaic solar generators, water electrolyzers, hydrogen and oxygen storage facilities, 
and so on as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Diagram of the solar-hydrogen plant [10]. 
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The solar hydrogen plant produces hydrogen and oxygen by electrochemically 
decomposing of water in an electrolyser. In the electrolysis process of water the electric 
current is passed through an electrolyte solution (potassium hydroxide or alkali) and  
decompose the water into its constituent elements: hydrogen and oxygen. Hydrogen is 
formed in the cathode and oxygen in the anode. A diaphragm separates the two cells to 
keep the two gases from recombining into water.  The produced hydrogen is then stored in 
a pressurized vessel.  
 
 
4.2 Description of the Hydrogen Storage 
 The high-pressure hydrogen tank of the plant stores the largest hydrogen inventory of 5000 
Nm
3
 compared to other components, see Fig. 5. It consists of two horizontal cylindrical 
high-pressure hydrogen storages with an operating pressure of 3 MPa at ambient 
temperature. The tank is filled directly from the water electrolysis in the plant generated 
from the two low-pressure electrolyzes requiring subsequent compression of the product 
gases. The stored hydrogen in this plant is mainly used for energetic utilization, such as 
fuel cells and gas-fired heating boilers of calorific-value. Two types of fuel cell plants, i.e. 
alkaline and phosphoric acid were tested.  
 
Fig. 5 Simplified P&I Diagram of the GH2 storage [10]. 
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5. THE RESULTS 
 
The study considers a hydrogen production plant. Total number of installations in the study 
object where a safety evaluation has to be made can be very large. Since not all 
installations contribute significantly to the risk, it is not worthwhile to include all 
installations in the QRA. The QRA may be carried out if the hydrogen (as a dangerous 
substance) is thought to be present at a location (e.g. industrial sites and transportation 
routes) in amounts that can endanger the environment. For hydrogen, the threshold level 
amount is 5 tons [12]. Based on the above guidelines the study was focused on the 
hydrogen storages, as they have the greatest potential damage and large release of hydrogen 
and consequential damage.  
 
5.1. Frequency Analysis Results 
 
Expected frequencies of the accident scenarios for the H2 storages at the production plant 
were synthesised from the component failure rate data associated with each of the 
identified failure mode, using the FTA approach. Two accident scenarios (top events) are 
considered, i.e. instantaneous and continuous. The summary of the fault tree analyses 
results for the plant with the trial number of 10,000 is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Expected frequencies of the GH2 storage at production plant  
 
Release 
Scenario 
Distribution parameters 
K-95 Percentage 
5% 50% Mean 95% 
Instantaneous 4.8E-09 1.7E-07 1.8E-06 6.2E-06 35.8 5.0% 
Continuous 1.9E-06 1.5E-05 3.4E-05 1.2E-04 14.2 95.0% 
Overall 1.8E-06 1.5E-05 3.6E-05 1.3E-04 8.6 100.0% 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the expected mean frequency of the overall system is 3.6 x 10
-5
/year, in 
other words once per 27,777 years. The contribution of instantaneous release of hydrogen 
from the GH2 tank is 1.8 x 10
-6
 /year (once per 555,556 years), while continuous release is 
3.4 x 10
-5
 /year (once per 29,412 years).  
Instantaneous release is only 5% of the overall hydrogen release from the GH2 storage. 
 
The accident outcome frequencies of the GH2 Storage at production plant is shown in 
Table 2. The mean value is obtained by multiplying the mean instantaneous frequencies or 
continuous frequencies (that is given in Table 1) with the conditional probabilities of the 
accident outcomes that has been calculated from the event tree diagram for GH2 release.  
Table 2 implies that fire outcomes (bold) account for about 67%, more dominant than 
explosion. The accident outcome resulting explosion is about 7%, and 26% may have no 
effect on the human population. 
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Table2. Accident outcome frequencies of the GH2 Storage at production plant  
 
Release 
Scenario 
Accident 
Outcomes 
Conditional 
Probability  
5% 50% Mean 95% 
Instantaneous 
Early explosion 0.008 1.4E-08 1.1E-07 2.7E-07 9.8E-07 
Fireball 0.030 5.4E-08 4.5E-07 1.1E-06 3.9E-06 
Late Explosion 0.000 4.1E-10 3.4E-09 8.1E-09 2.9E-08 
Flash Fire 0.001 1.6E-09 1.4E-08 3.2E-08 1.2E-07 
Continuous 
Jet Fire 0.475 8.5E-07 7.1E-06 1.7E-05 6.2E-05 
Late Explosion 0.043 7.7E-08 6.4E-07 1.5E-06 5.6E-06 
Flash Fire 0.171 3.1E-07 2.6E-06 6.1E-06 2.2E-05 
No effect on human population 0.273 4.9E-07 4.1E-06 9.8E-06 3.5E-05 
Overall 1.000 8.6E-06 2.8E-05 3.6E-05 9.0E-05 
 
 
5.2. Consequence Modelling Results 
 
The hydrogen release may result in different types of consequences, such as jet fire, 
fireball, explosions and so on.  Each of the outcomes was modelled for different shapes and 
sizes that are required for impact calculations. Circle and ellipse are the most shapes 
considered to calculate impact zones resulted from fires and explosions. The study 
considers fire and explosion hazards because they may result fatality to the population 
around the installation.   
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Side view of the consequence analysis resulted from the hydrogen plant. 
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Fig. 7  Lethality radii for fireball may be resulted from the hydrogen plant 
 
Table 3 below shows a summary of the effect distances resulting in fatalities to the nearby 
populations for given fatalities level: 1%, 10% and 60%.  Different shapes of the 
consequence results (e.g. impact zones) calculated by PHAST software is shown in Fig. 6 
and Fig. 7. 
 
Table 3. Effect distances (stated in meter) of the consequence impacts for the plant. 
 
No Event outcomes 
Fatality level 
1% 10% 60% 
1 Fireball 42.9 35.4 26.3 
2 Jet fires 22.6 21.4 19.6 
3 Early explosion 334.4 86.7 67.0 
4 Late explosion (VCE), rupture 110.2 92.1 --- 
5 Flash fires --- ---- 37.9 
 
 
5.3. The Risk 
 
Recommended individual risk regulation according to the Dutch National Environmental 
Policy Plan 1989 is 1 x 10
-6
 /year. The individual risk of the hydrogen storages as shown in 
Fig. 8 runs in the unacceptability zone (>1 x 10
-6
 /year) for effect distance of 0 – 90m.  
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Fig.8 The individual risk (IR) of the study object 
 
 
      
 
Fig.9 The societal risk (F-N curve) of the study object 
Jurnal Ilmiah Teknologi Energi, Vol.1, No.3, Agustus 2006                                                  ISSN 1858 - 3466 
 78 
 
The societal risk  (F-N curve) of the study objects in Fig.9 appear globally lower than the 
individual risk shown in Fig.8.  Also the curves (relevant to the hydrogen storage) fall 
within the ‘acceptable’ risk mentioned in ‘ALARA’ (As Low As Reasonable Achievable)  
zones.  ALARA is the standard of societal risk developed in the Netherlands.  
This means that the hydrogen plant can be accepted for public.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The individual risk for the hydrogen plant run almost entirely in the unacceptability zone. 
The societal risk, however, appears globally lower than the individual risk. In fact, the 
curves fall within the acceptable zone. Should the plants be implemented for the public, yes 
but the risk must be reduced as far as reasonable and practicable, typically subject to cost 
benefit analysis. 
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